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 ABSTRACT    
 
Market concentration in the Korean banking industry has markedly increased since the financial 
crisis of 1997-1998 because of M&As, P&As, and consolidation of banks. With this change, there 
has been a growing concern over market power in the Korean banking sector. We examine the 
effects of market concentration on bank efficiency and competition for the period of 1992-2006. 
Three different indicators of bank inefficiency are used in this study, including X-inefficiency that is 
derived from the directional technology distance function. The level of competition is measured by 
both the H-statistic of the Panzar-Rosse model and the level of the net interest margin and its standard 
deviation. 
Empirical results indicate that market concentration has not improved bank efficiency through 
scale economies or scope economies. Instead, recent mergers, acquisitions and consolidation of 
banks resulted in an increase in inefficiency measured by the three different indicators: X-
inefficiency, labor inefficiency and asset inefficiency. While an increase in market share of individual 
banks improved bank efficiency, an increase in the overall market concentration ratio resulted in 
lower efficiency. Our study also finds that the Korean banking sector has been monopolistically 
competitive throughout the sample period except for the crisis period according to the H-statistic. 
Although an increase in market concentration ratio has not changed the overall level of bank 
competition, it has a positive significant effect on the level of the average interest margin.  
 
 
 
 
한국 은행산업의 시장집중은 1997~98년 
금융위기 이후 은행들의 합병, 인수 등으로 
현저하게 증가하였다. 이러한 변화와 함께, 
한국 금융부문의 시장지배력에 대한 우려 또
한 늘어났다. 본고는 1992~2006년의 기간 
동안 한국에서의 은행의 효율성과 경쟁도에 
대한 시장집중도 변화의 효과를 분석하고자 
한다. 은행 비효율성의 측정을 위하여 방향성 
기술거리함수에서 도출되는 X-비효율을 포
함한 세 가지 다른 지표가 본 연구에 사용되
었으며, 은행의 경쟁도는 Panzar-Rosse 모
형의 H-통계로, 또는 순이자 마진의 수준과 
편차의 변화로 측정하였다.  
실증분석 결과에 따르면, 시장집중 증가가 
규모 및 범위의 경제를 통해 은행의 효율성을 
 제고하지 못한 것으로 나타났다. 오히려 최근
의 은행 합병, 인수와 통합은 세 가지 지표 
(X-비효율, 노동 비효율 및 자산 비효율)에 
의해 측정된 비효율성을 증가시키는 것으로 
나타났다. 개별 은행의 시장점유율 증가는 은
행의 효율성을 개선시키는 반면, 전체 은행의 
시장집중도의 증가는 효율성을 낮추는 결과
를 초래했다. 또한 본 연구는, 한국의 은행부
문은 금융위기 기간을 제외한 샘플 기간 동
안 독점적 경쟁의 특징을 가지고 있다는 결
과를 얻었다. 시장집중도의 증가는 은행 경
쟁도의 전반적인 수준에 변화를 초래하지는 
않았지만, 평균 이자 마진의 수준에 통계적
으로 유의적인 정(+)의 효과가 있는 것으로 
나타났다.  
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
 
 
During the last two decades a fundamental change in banking market structure 
occurred in many countries through mergers and acquisitions (M&As), purchase of 
assets and assumptions of liabilities (P&As) and consolidation under financial 
holding companies. Financial deregulation and financial globalization accompanied 
by advance in information technology triggered fierce competition among banks and 
necessitated M&As, P&As and consolidation in the world to reduce risk through 
business diversification and take advantage of scale economies. Korea is no 
exception. Over the last twenty years the Korean banking system went through 
many changes: financial deregulation, financial crisis, and restructuring. In this 
process, market concentration initially decreased as the number of banks increased 
due to financial deregulation prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, but, after 
the crisis, the concentration ratio increased because of a decline in the number of 
banks due to bank closures and creation of mega banks through bank mergers, 
acquisitions and consolidation. The structural reform after the financial crisis 
introduced the financial holding company system and allowed mergers among 
larger banks, resulting in a few super-size banks.  
Park and Weber (2006a) estimate Korean bank efficiency and productivity change 
for the period 1992 to 2002. These estimates are derived from the directional 
technology distance function. Their method controls for loan losses that are an 
undesirable by-product arising from the production of loans and allows the 
aggregation of individual bank inefficiency and productivity growth to the industry 
level. Their findings indicate that technical progress during the period was more 
than enough to offset efficiency declines so that the banking industry experienced 
productivity growth. Park (2009) examines market concentration and competition in 
the Korean commercial banking market for the period of 1992-2004. The H-statistic of 
the Panzar-Rosse model indicates that the Korean commercial banking market was 
monopolistically competitive during the pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period 
with temporary deviation to the level of perfect competition during the crisis period. 
However, the crisis period could not pass the equilibrium condition test. The author 
concludes that increased concentration has not lessened the overall level of 
competition in Korea.  
This paper is built upon Park and Weber (2006a) and Park (2009), but extends 
further to examine the effects of M&As, P&As and consolidation and the subsequent 
increase in market concentration on efficiency and competition in the Korean 
banking sector, using 1992-2006 data. While the previous two papers focus on 
measurement and changes in the levels of efficiency and competition of Korean 
banks, this paper examines what are the main determinants of the levels of efficiency 
and competition and how significant the effects of market concentration are in the 
Korean banking industry. Furthermore, updated data are used in this study: data of 
four more years compared to Park and Weber (2006a) and data of two more years 
data compared to Park (2009). Section 2 describes the activities of M&As, P&As and 
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consolidation occurring in the Korean banking sector and the resulting trend in 
market concentration during the sample period. Section 3 introduces the directional 
technology distance function used to estimate efficiency and analyzes the effects of 
market concentration on efficiency. Section 4 discusses the method used to measure 
the degree of competition and then estimates the effects of market concentration on 
competition. In the final section we offer a summary of our work and draw 
conclusions.  
 
 
Ⅱ. M&As, P&As, Consolidation and Market Concentration 
 
 
Market concentration can be measured in a number of ways. The most 
straightforward method is to calculate what share of the industry’s output is sold by 
a few dominant firms, typically measured by the sum of top k-firm market shares 
(CRk). Another formula now widely used is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). 
HHI is measured by the sum of the squares of each firm’s market share in an 
industry. The top k-firm concentration ratio (CRk) was previously used by the Fair 
Trade Commission in Korea in determining the degree of anti-competition of a 
proposed merger until it adopted HHI as a new criterion a few years ago. Previously 
a market with CR1 greater than 50% or CR3 greater than 70% was regarded as a 
highly concentrated market. While the Fair Trade Commission in Korea and the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in the US use HHI in their 
antitrust policy currently, their classification of markets is somewhat different. Both 
agree on the classification of highly concentrated markets as those with HHI above 
2,500. However, they differ in classifying unconcentrated markets: HHI below 1200 
in Korea while HHI below 1500 in the US.  
Table 1 presents the trend of market concentration in the Korean banking 
industry by the number of banks, HHI and CR3 of bank total assets, bank total loans 
and bank total deposits for the period of 1992-2006. There was a decreasing trend of 
market concentration in all three variables until the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
1998. This trend began in 1982 as financial deregulation induced entry of new banks 
and caused fierce competition among the existing banks. Until the Korean 
government introduced a series of financial reforms in 1982, the number of national 
commercial banks was limited to five while ten much smaller regional banks were 
allowed in order to stimulate regional economic development. With financial 
liberalization, the number of national commercial banks increased from five to 
fourteen in 1992, leading to a decrease in market concentration. Just before the crisis, 
there was a concern of overbanking in Korea. However, closures of insolvent banks 
and mergers with blue-chip banks after the crisis resulted in a drastic increase in the 
market concentration ratio.  
The change in market concentration after the crisis reflects the structural reform 
in the banking sector carried out by the Korean government. The Korean 
government began a two-phase financial restructuring. In its first-phase 
restructuring from 1998 to 2000, three types of merger occurred. First, five insolvent 
banks were merged into five sound banks in the form of P&As in 1998. Dongwha  
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<Table 1> Trend of Market Concentration in the Korean Banking Industry 
Year # of Banks 
Total Assets Total Loans Total Deposits 
HHI CR3 HHI CR3 HHI CR3 
1992 24 876.06 36.42 945.35 39.04 832.11 34.27 
1993 24 827.22 34.69 897.83 36.94 789.16 33.10 
1994 24 787.92 33.15 825.57 34.40 761.48 31.85 
1995 25 714.79 30.15 742.38 30.36 703.21 28.88 
1996 25 706.56 29.78 740.30 30.63 698.79 29.30 
1997 26 664.23 28.32 704.33 29.37 662.33 28.07 
1998 21 807.75 34.46 770.40 36.41 779.38 32.86 
1999 17 936.73 38.67 1021.24 45.03 942.30 40.24 
2000 17 982.71 40.99 1062.20 46.49 995.03 42.43 
2001 15 1441.16 52.23 1623.02 55.43 1437.78 52.18 
2002 14 1480.98 54.38 1575.62 56.93 1427.62 54.29 
2003 14 1407.32 53.18 1498.29 55.71 1403.81 53.97 
2004 14 1324.59 51.09 1446.04 54.89 1350.35 52.80 
2005 14 1285.58 51.17 1387.38 54.34 1303.57 52.50 
2006 13 1466.43 52.27 1551.96 61.45 1460.48 57.42  
Note: 1) Total assets, loans and deposits include both banking accounts and trust accounts.  
2) The correlation coefficients among the three HHIs are 0.995 or higher, and the correlation 
coefficients among the three CR3s are 0.984 or higher. 
 
 
Bank was acquired by Shinhan Bank, Daedong Bank by Kukmin Bank, Dongnam 
Bank by the Housing and Commercial Bank, Kyungki Bank by Hanmi Bank, and 
Chung Chong Bank by Hana Bank. Second, involuntary mergers between three 
groups of relatively sound banks were initiated by the Korean government. They are 
the merger of Commercial Bank of Korea and Hanil Bank to form Hanvit Bank, the 
merger of Choongbuk Bank and Kangwon Bank into Cho Heung Bank, and the 
merger of the Long-term Credit Bank into Kukmin Bank in 1999. Third, there was 
one voluntary merger of two privately-owned banks, Boram Bank merging into 
Hana Bank. The second and third types of mergers are in the form of M&As.  
The second-phase restructuring that began in 2001 focused on restoring bank 
profitability. This structural reform also introduced the financial holding company 
system and allowed mergers among larger banks, resulting in a few super-size banks. 
In 2001, Woori Holding Co. consolidated the following four banks: Hanvit Bank, 
Kwangju Bank, Kyungnam Bank and Peace Bank. In 2002, there was a merger of 
Kukmin Bank and the Housing and Commercial Bank, and Shinhan Financial 
Holding Co. consolidated Shinhan Bank and the Bank of Cheju. In 2005, Hanmi Bank 
was acquired by Citi Bank and renamed as Korea Citi Bank. In the same year, the 
Standard and Charter Bank acquired Korea First Bank that was nationalized in 1998 
and sold to the Newbridge Capital in 1999 and renamed it as SC Korea First Bank. In 
2006, Cho Heung Bank was merged into Shinhan Bank.  
As a result of P&As, M&As and consolidation, the number of banks was reduced 
and the average asset size of banks increased. While a few mega banks were 
established through mergers, acquisitions and creation of financial holding 
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companies, small regional banks remained unchanged. Thus the Korean banking 
industry experienced polarization in bank size, leading to greater market 
concentration. Some observers are concerned that this policy may have a negative 
effect on competition and efficiency in the Korean banking industry. The post-crisis 
period is also characterized by increasing market share by foreign banks and 
increasing foreign ownership share of domestic banks.  
In summary, the Korean banking sector prior to the crisis can be regarded as a 
non-concentrated market with HHI less than 1,000 in total assets, total loans and 
total deposits according to either the Korean or the US horizontal merger guidelines. 
After the crisis, particularly after the second-phase restructuring in 2001, the Korean 
commercial banking market became a moderately concentrated market with HHI 
ranging between 1,300 and 1,500 according to the Korean antitrust guideline. 
Although not reported in the table, HHI is in excess of 1800 in some specific sub-
markets such as loans to households and deposits in foreign currency. HHI figures of 
Korea banks are higher than those of banks in other OECD countries of a similar 
population size. For example, HHI of Spanish banks was in the 700s and HHI of 
Italian banks was in the 600s according to the 2000 data of the European Central 
Bank. Will creation of mega banks contribute to improving efficiency and overall 
competitiveness of the Korean banking industry? Or will this have a negative effect 
on competition and efficiency. This paper discusses these issues and investigates the 
effects of market concentration on efficiency and competition.  
 
 
Ⅲ. Effects of Market Concentration on Efficiency  
 
 
There are several methods for estimating efficiency. A frontier cost or production 
function is typically used to estimate efficiency (or inefficiency). A stochastic frontier 
approach based on parametric estimation decomposes the error term into an 
inefficiency component and a random component. There are two stochastic 
approaches: distribution-free and distribution-specific. If a distribution-free 
approach is to be used as in Berger (1995), then the differences among banks are 
assumed to be stable over time. The distribution-free approach requires that banks 
be in existence for the entire sample period. It is difficult to apply this approach in 
the case of the Korean banking sector for the period of 1992-2006 because of frequent 
bank entry and exit during this period. If a distribution-specific approach is used as 
in Maudos (1998), then it is necessary to know the distribution for both components 
of the error term. Without prior knowledge of the distribution, arbitrary assumptions 
about its shape are made in most studies.  
 As a non-parametric approach, data envelopment analysis (DEA) is frequently 
used. This approach has the advantage of identifying best practices based upon 
observed costs rather than some hypothetical average derided from a given 
functional form. The DEA approach assumes that any deviation from minimum cost 
is due entirely to inefficiency. Using a non-parametric directional technology 
distance function, Park and Weber (2006a) estimated efficiency change in the Korean 
banking industry and Park and Weber (2006b) measured X-inefficiency of individual 
banks in Korea.  
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Following Park and Weber (2006a) and Park and Weber (2006b), we define the 
directional technology distance function for each bank as  
 
⃗(xvk, ek, yk, gx, ge, gy) = max{:(xk − gx, ek − ge, yk + gy) ∈ T }       (A1) 
 
where variable inputs are contracted in the direction gx, equity capital is 
contracted in the direction ge, and outputs are expanded in the direction of gy. A bank 
that produces on the frontier is efficient with ⃗(xvk, ek, yk, gx, ge, gy) for the direction 
(gx, ge, gy). A value of ⃗(xvk, ek, yk, gx, ge, gy) > 0 indicates inefficiency for the g-
directional vector, and this value is used in this study as X-inefficiency. 
For estimation, we assume that Korean banks produce three desirable outputs 
using three inputs. The desirable outputs are commercial loans, consumer loans and 
securities. The three variable inputs are full-time labor, physical capital which equals 
the asset value of premises and fixed assets, and total deposits. Assuming that equity 
capital () is fixed exogenously by bank regulators and owners, we sum inefficiency 
over the outputs and inputs and divide by total assets. 
 
 −   = (∑gym+ ∑gxn)/Assets = (1+1+1+1+1+1)/Assets.       (A2) 
m        n 
 
We choose gy=(1,1,1) and gx=(1,1,1) so that the estimate of inefficiency is the 
simultaneous unit expansion in the three outputs and unit contraction in the three 
inputs that is feasible, given the best-practice. See Appendix 1 for more detailed 
discussions.  
Alternatively, a simple, though rudimentary, approach is to approximate 
operating efficiency directly from the financial statements of each bank. We use a 
proxy for labor inefficiency or operating inefficiency: the operating expenses per 
employee. Similarly, we use a proxy for asset inefficiency: the operating expenses 
divided by total assets. The ratio of total loans to employees is suggested as a 
measure of operating inefficiency by Koch and MacDonald (2003). However, with 
deregulation and universal banking practice, the financial intermediation function of 
banks through loans has weakened. Therefore, it would be desirable to use total 
assets that include securities, foreign exchanges and other investments in addition to 
loans.  
To examine the effects of market concentration on efficiency (or inefficiency) we 
estimate the following regression equation.  
 
E = α + β ∑X, + γ ∑Y,  + δ∑Z, + ε                         (A3) 
 
where E = different efficiency (or inefficiency) indicators of bank i at time t, Xk, 
it=bank specific variables of bank i at time t, such as BIS equity ratio, NPL(non 
performing loans) SHARE, BRANCH and a dummy variable for regional banks, 
Y, = market power variables of bank i at time t, such as the market share and HHI. 
Z, = macroeconomic variables such as economic growth rate, inflation rate and a 
dummy variable for the crisis period. We use three different indicators of efficiency 
(or inefficiency) indicators: X-inefficiency obtained from estimation of equation (A2), 
labor inefficiency measured by the operating expenses per employee, and asset 
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<Table 2> Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Assets Share 0.2245 29.4781 5.0004 4.9930 
Loans Share 0.0570 33.2854 5.0000 5.3564 
Deposits Share 0.2435 29.4880 5.0001 4.9253 
HHI -Assets 0.0707 0.1481 0.0934 0.0270 
HHI-Loans 0.0704 0.1623 0.0993 0.0317 
HHI-Deposits 0.0703 0.1461 0.0919 0.0273 
BIS -10.65 32.16 10.8342 4.5113 
NPL SHARE 
BRANCH 
Interest Margin 
0.1000 
14 
-1.88 
24.6000 
1185 
3.54 
4.9732 
229.87 
1.6306 
4.1862 
198.113 
0.7639 
X-Inefficiency 0.00 3.56 0.2958 0.5408 
Labor Inefficiency 0.2984 14.7542 4.7088 3.4952 
Asset Inefficiency 0.0232 0.2341 0.07819 0.0374 
 
 
inefficiency measured by the operating expenses divided by total assets. We use 
panel data including all Korean national and regional banks in operation in any year 
during the period of 1992-2006. Data used in this study are from the Bank 
Management Statistics by the Bank of Korea and from the financial statements of 
individual banks.  
Table 2 shows summary descriptive statistics for the major variables used in this 
study. The BIS risk-adjusted ratio of equity capital to total assets (BIS) is used as a 
control variable for management risk or for the impact of leverage on efficiency. The 
BIS risk-adjusted capital ratio is calculated according to the Bank of International 
Settlements guidelines, which assign varying risk weights to different types of assets. 
The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL SHARE) is included to control 
for the risk effect. The number of branches (BRANCH) is included to account for the 
effect of bank networks. A dummy indicator variable is defined as 1 for regional 
banks and 0 for national banks to see the effect of being a regional bank. Market 
share is measured for three different types of assets or liabilities; assets share, loans 
share and deposits share are the bank’s share of total industry assets, loans and 
deposits respectively. HHI that measures the degree of market concentration equals 
the sum of the squares of each bank’s market share of total industry assets, loans or 
deposits. INTREST MARGIN, the net interest margin, is the difference between the 
interest rates on loans and securities and the interest rates on deposits and 
borrowings. This variable is estimated by the average earnings on assets minus the 
average interest expenses on assets. Two macroeconomic variables, economic growth 
rate and inflation rate, and one macroeconomic dummy variable indicating the 
financial crisis period are used to see macroeconomic effects. The period of 1997-1999 
is regarded in this study as the crisis period. Even though the currency crisis was 
over in 1998, the bank crisis continued through 1999.  
Table 3A and Table 3B present the estimated results of equation (A3). In the 
estimation of panel data, application of ordinary multiple regression techniques may  
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<Table 3A> Panel Regression Results of Equation (A3) 
Dependent Variables: Labor Inefficiency and Asset Inefficiency, n=285  
Category Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Labor Inefficiency Asset Inefficiency  
Bank Specific 
Variables  
BIS -0.028  
(-0.774)  
-0.033  
(-0.917) 
-0.027  
(-0.766)  
0.001  
(0.023)  
-0.001  
(-0.224)  
0.001  
(0.001)  
NPL SHARE 0.162**  
(4.296)  
0.132**  
(3.468)  
0.158**  
(4.299)  
0.005**  
(12.971)  
0.005**  
(12.144)  
0.005**  
(12.974)  
BRANCH 0.002  
(1.354)  
0.003*  
(2.060)  
0.002  
(1.536)  
0.001**  
(3.267)  
0.001*  
(2.515)  
0.001**  
(3.308)  
Regional Bank 
Dummy 
-1.799**  
(-4.763)  
-1.646**  
(-4.510)  
-1.923**  
(-5.249)  
0.006* 
(1.998)  
0.010*  
(2.475)  
0.005  
(1.255)  
Market Power  
Variables  
Assets Share  -0.043*  
(-2.193) 
   -0.002**  
(-3.350) 
   
HHI (assets) 66.146**  
(15.293)  
  0.378** 
(9.089) 
  
Loans Share   -0.086 
(-1.550) 
  -0.002** 
(-2.610) 
 
HHI (loans)   58.786**  
(15.283) 
  0.333**  
(8.095) 
 
Deposits Share    -0.73* 
(-2.009) 
  -0.002** 
(-3.474) 
HHI (deposits)    67.364** 
(16.000) 
  0.392** 
(8.274) 
Macroeconomic 
Variables  
GDP Growth Rate  -0.183**  
(-4.642)  
-0.033  
(-0.571)  
-0.185**  
(-4.789)  
-0.001  
(-0.1770)  
-0.001  
(-1.890)  
-0.001  
(-1.780)  
Inflation Rate 0.222**  
(3.129)  
0.442  
(4.786)  
0.157**  
(2.766)  
0.003**  
(3.654)  
0.001  
(0.542)  
0.003**  
(3.960)  
CRISIS 3.180**  
(6.619)  
7.752**  
(7.512)  
3.169**  
(6.753)  
0.034**  
(6.554)  
0.074**  
(6.888)  
0.034**  
(6.610)  
Adj. R2  0.863  0.863  0.869  0.927  0.929  0.928  
F  180.84  169.97  190.68  366.09  352.50  371.84   
Note: 1) Estimation results of fixed effects model. The coefficients of the constant under the fixed effects 
model are not reported here  
2) t values are shown in parentheses. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
 
result in omitted variable bias. Hsiao (1986) demonstrated that pooled OLS results in 
biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates because omitted cross-section-specific 
variables may be correlated with the explanatory variables. Use of either a fixed- 
effects model or a random-effects model can solve this problem. A fixed effects 
model is commonly used to control for omitted variables that differ between banks 
but are constant over time while a random effects model is used to control for some 
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<Table 3B> Panel Regression Results of Equation (A3)  
Dependent Variables: X-Inefficiency, n = 285  
Category Variable 
(7)  (8)  (9)  
X - Inefficiency 
Bank Specific 
Variables  
BIS 0.002  
(1.018)  
0.002 
(1.146)  
0.002 
(1.092)  
NPL SHARE -0.002* 
(-2.126) 
-0.003* 
(-2.254) 
-0.002* 
(-2.198) 
BRANCH 0.001** 
(5.338) 
0.001** 
(5.407) 
0.001** 
(5.561) 
Regional Bank Dummy 0.014 
(0.740)  
0.013 
(0.671) 
0.008 
(0.409) 
Market Power  
Variables  
Assets Share  -0.001* 
(-2.011) 
   
HHI (assets)  0.272** 
(4.387) 
  
Loans Share   -0.002** 
(-2.867) 
 
HHI (loans)   0.190** 
(4.654) 
 
Deposits Share   -0.004 
(-1.856) 
HHI (deposits)   0.271** 
(3.775) 
Macroeconomic  
Variables  
GDP Growth Rate  -0.006 
(-1.833) 
-0.005* 
(-2.080) 
-0.006* 
(-2.016) 
Inflation Rate 0.010 
(1.724) 
0.010 
(1.882) 
0.009 
(1.679) 
CRISIS 0.030** 
(2.907) 
0.002* 
(2.222) 
0.031** 
(2.769) 
Adj. R2  0.674 0.681 0.678 
F  51.78 57.32 54.33  
Note: 1) Estimation results of fixed effects model. The coefficients of the constant under the fixed effects 
model are not reported here  
2) t values are shown in parentheses. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
 
bank-variant omitted variables and other time-variant omitted variables. In the 
absence of prior knowledge about omitted variables, we estimate both models and 
run the Hausman test comparing fixed effects vs. random effects. Based on the 
Hausman test, we report the fixed effects model only in the following table. The 
fixed effects model is usually regarded as more appropriate than random effects 
model when population data instead of sample data are used as in our study.  
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Market power variables show interesting results. An increase in market share by 
individual banks contributes to a decrease in X-inefficiency, labor inefficiency and 
asset inefficiency while an increase in market concentration causes greater 
inefficiency. The opposite signs of SHARE (individual bank’s market share) and HHI 
(overall market concentration level) seems to be contradictory, but can be explained. 
Under the efficient structure hypothesis, efficient banks have higher profits and 
larger market shares, thus negative correlation between market share and 
inefficiency. On the other hand, as overall market concentration level increases, the 
degree of competition among banks as well as their efforts to be efficient are lessened.  
When we add the square term of HHI in the regression equation, significant 
negative coefficients are obtained for all the models. Therefore, their relationship is 
not completely linear, but of an inverse U-shaped curve, indicating that economies of 
scale leading to operating efficiency kick off at a certain level of market concentration. 
Appendix 2 shows the estimated results of model A3 with addition of HHI (assets). 
Among the bank specific variables, BIS turns out to be insignificant in influencing 
operating efficiency, asset efficiency or X-efficiency. NPL SHARE has definitely a 
positive effect on operating costs and thus inefficiency as expected. The more 
branches, the higher operating cost per worker or asset. Being a regional bank does 
not affect X-inefficiency or asset inefficiency, but it has a significant negative effect on 
labor inefficiency. Regional banks are less prestigious and less competitive compared 
to national banks, and they tend to spend less on employee compensations and other 
overhead costs. However, lower labor cost does not necessarily imply higher labor 
productivity or higher profitability. Park and Weber (2006b) show that a dummy 
variable representing national banks has a positive and significant coefficient in 
explaining Koran bank profitability.  
Among the macroeconomic variables, a dummy variable representing the crisis 
period stands out. In all nine different models, CRISIS has a positive significant effect 
on bank inefficiency. Both the GDP growth rate and the inflation rate show expected 
coefficient signs, a negative effect of the GDP growth rate on inefficiency and a 
positive effect of the inflation on inefficiency. However, significance of the 
coefficients varies among different model specifications. The explanatory power 
(Adjusted R) of Models 1-6 is very high and that of Models 7-9 is acceptable. In 
summary, empirical results indicate that market concentration has not improved 
bank efficiency through taking advantage of scale economies or scope economies. 
Instead, recent mergers, acquisitions and consolidation of banks led to greater 
inefficiency in terms of X-inefficiency, labor inefficiency and asset inefficiency. 
 
 
Ⅳ. Effects of Market Concentration on Competition 
 
 
In this section we examine the effects of market concentration on the level of 
competition among banks. Following Panzar and Rosse (1987), the degree of 
competition can be measured as the H-statistic which is the sum of the elasticities of 
the revenue with respect to input prices. 
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H = ∑(∂R/ ∂w)(w/R)                                                 (B1) 
 
where wi is i  input price. Panzar and Rosse (1987) show from the profit 
maximization condition that the H-statistic is equal to unity (H = 1) in a perfectly 
competitive market, and less than or equal to zero (H ≤ 0) under monopoly. 
Although the Panzar-Rosse article also shows that 0<H<1 could be consistent with 
oligopolistic behavior, it is common to regard 0<H<1 as the condition of 
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. The H-statistic can be derived from the 
following reduced-form revenue equation. 
 
ln(Rit) = α + β1 ln(w1,it) + β2 ln(w2,it) + β3 ln(w3,it) + γk Σ zk + ε it         (B2)  
 
where Rit is bank i’s revenue at time t, w1 is the input price of labor, w2 is the 
input price of capital, w3 is the input price of funds, and zk is a vector of control 
variables affecting the bank’s revenue function.  
The H-statistic is the sum of β1, β2 and β3. w1,it (The unit labor cost) is measured 
by the ratio of personnel expenses to the number of employees, w2,it (the unit capital 
cost) is measured by the ratio of depreciation allowance and other maintenance costs 
to total fixed assets, and w3,it (the unit funding cost) is measured by the ratio of 
interest expenses to the sum of total deposits and borrowings. Several control 
variables are included in the model. Total assets (ASSET) are included to see the size 
effect. BRANCH, even though it may show the effect of bank networks, is not 
included in the model because of its high correlation with ASSET. The ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans (NPL SHARE) is included to control for the risk effect. 
The BIS risk-adjusted capital ratio (BIS) is alternatively used as a control variable for 
credit market and operational risk. There has been weakening of the financial 
intermediation function of banks in Korea over time. The ratio of non-interest 
revenue to total revenue (NINT) is included to reflect the effect of changing financial 
intermediation or diversification. Traditionally Rit (revenue) is typically measured by 
interest revenue or its ratio to total assets, presuming that the main function of banks 
is financial intermediation. However, with weakening of financial intermediation in 
recent years and diversification of bank assets, total revenue or its ratio to total assets 
is used in some studies. In this study we use both interest revenue (IR) in log and 
total revenue (TR) in log as the dependent variable.  
In regard to the relationship between concentration and competition in the 
Korean banking sector, Kim (2003) measures competition using the Bresnahan-Lau 
method of Bresnahan (1989) and Lau (1982) based on aggregate monthly data from 
1996 to 2002 and finds that the pricing behavior of Korean banks during this period 
is consistent with perfect competition and that they behave more competitively even 
after the increase in concentration ratio. On the other hand, applying the Panzar-
Rosse method, Lee and Lee (2005) find that the Korean banking market shows 
monopolistically competitive behavior for both the period of 1992-1997 and the 
period of 1998-2002 while market competition weakened significantly over the latter 
period. Park (2009) estimated the H-statistic with the data from Korean banks for the 
period of 1992-2004 and found that the Korean banking industry exhibits 
monopolistically competitive behavior except for the Asian financial crisis period.  
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<Table 4> Estimation Results of Equation (B2) 
Dependent variables: lnIR and lnTR, n=285  
 Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model  
lnIR lnTR lnIR lnTR 
Constant    -0.256** 
(-1.917) 
-0.277**  
(-1.895)  
lnW1  0.126***  
(7.325)  
0.127***  
(7.053)  
0.130***  
(8.736)  
0.123***  
(8.462)  
lnW2  -0.003  
(-0.083)  
0.005  
(0.313)  
0.022  
(0.978)  
0.028  
(1.531)  
lnW3  0.647***  
(29.969)  
0.648***  
(28.121)  
0.654***  
(29.562)  
0.656***  
(28.934)  
lnASSET  0.947***  
(44.757)  
0.942***  
(43.151)  
0.931***  
(47.001)  
0.929***  
(46.082)  
NINT  -0.365***  
(-5.769)  
1.276***  
(21.737)  
-0.389***  
(-6.519)  
1.205***  
(20.542)  
NPL SHARE  -0.002  
(-1.306)  
-0.001  
(-0.848)  
-0.001  
(-0.775)  
-0.000  
(-0.412)  
BIS  0.011***  
(7.915)  
0.012***  
(8.231)  
0.012***  
(8.783)  
0.014***  
(8.812)  
ADJ. R2  0.997  0.997  0.997  0.997  
H statistic  0.776***  
(24.192)  
0.753***  
(24.828)  
0.812***  
(26.553)  
0.822***  
(26.678)  
Wald test: H=0  
(ρ-value)  
537.27***  
(0.000)  
551.35***  
(0.000)  
665.89***  
(0.000)  
636.29***  
(0.000)  
Wald test: H=1  
(ρ-value)  
62.34***  
(0.000)  
47.71***  
(0.000)  
42.63***  
(0.000)  
36.47***  
(0.000)  
Note: 1) The coefficients of the constant under the fixed effects model are not reported here.  
2) t values are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
 
This study extends Park (2009) further by adding data of two more years when 
bigger mergers occurred. In addition, we not only estimate the degree of competition, 
but also examine what are the major determinants of the degree of competition. Even 
though the fixed effects model is usually regarded as more appropriate than random 
effects model when population data instead of sample data are used as in our study, 
we use both fixed and random effects models for comparison purpose.  
The estimation results of the tests of competitive condition (the H-statistic) are 
given in Table 4. The Wald test rejects the hypothesis of monopolistic market 
structure (H=0) at the 1% level. It also rejects the hypothesis of perfectly competitive 
market structure (H=1) at the 1% level. Bikker et al. (2006, 2009) reported that 
overestimation of H-statistic is possible in the Panzar-Rosse model when the  
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<Table 5> Market Concentration and Competition Level of Korean Banks 
Year  HHI – Total Loans H-statistic with lnIR  H-statistic with lnTR  
1992-1994  889.58  0.520  0.543  
1993-1995  821.93  0.609  0.623  
1994-1996  769.42  0.525  0.554  
1995-1997  729.00  0.410  0.461  
1996-1998  738.34  0.877  0.924  
1997-1999  831.99  0.884  0.944  
1998-2000  951.28  0.751  0.780  
1999-2001  1235.49  0.690  0.675  
2000-2002  1420.28  0.672  0.664  
2001-2003  1565.64  0.636  0.642  
2002-2004  1506.65  0.638  0.598  
2003-2005  1443.90  0.627  0.608  
2004-2006  1461.79  0.641  0.613  
Note: 1) H-statistic is estimated from fixed effects models. 
2) The correlation coefficient between HHI and the H statistic for lnIR is -0.002 while correlation 
coefficient between HHI and the H statistic for lnTR is -0.196. 
 
 
regression includes a scale variable such as the asset size. However, in this study, the 
H values, with exclusion of ASSET from the model, show similar test results with no 
indication that inclusion of a scale explanatory variable causes overestimation of the 
level of competition (See Appendix 3). w1,it and w3,it are positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that an increase in unit costs of labor or funds leads to higher 
revenue. w2,it is not statistically significant. When the scale variable, ASSET, is 
excluded, the unit capital cost exerts significant positive effect on revenue. All 
control variables have expected signs. 
To see how the H values changed over time, the H-statistics are estimated for 
moving three-year time periods, that is, 1992-1994, 1993-1995, 1994-1996 and so on. 
The estimation results of the H values that are reported in Table 5 along with HHI 
indicate that market concentration did not affect the competition level in the Korean 
banking industry. The correlation coefficient between HHI and the H statistic for 
lnIR is -0.002 while correlation coefficient between HHI and the H statistic for lnTR is 
-0.196, which indicates no or very low correlation between market concentration and 
competition.  
For only the two periods, 1996-1998 and1997-1999, the hypothesis of perfectly 
competitive market structure (H=1) cannot be rejected at the 1% level. It can be 
inferred from the empirical results that the Korean commercial banking market was 
monopolistically competitive during the pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period, 
while its level of competition increased to the level of perfect competition during the 
crisis period, which might be due to breakdown of old connections among banks, 
making collusion more difficult. However, these two periods could not pass the 
equilibrium condition test.  
As an alternative way of examining the degree of competition, we now turn to  
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[Figure 1] Regional and National Banks: Interest Margin and S.D. 
 
 
 
the interest margin. The average interest margin tends to increase when the market 
power in the banking industry increases. With polarization of bank size, the 
standard deviation of the net interest margin may also increase, resulting in higher 
margins for dominant banks and lower margins for less dominant banks. The data 
show that the average net interest margin for all banks declined during the crisis 
period, particularly in 1998, but returned to the pre-crisis level of about 2% in 2003 
and then a little higher since then as shown in Figure 1. The standard deviation 
declined mildly over the period even though there were jittery fluctuations during 
the crisis period (from 0.766 in 1992 to 0.496 in 2006). A similar trend in both 
variables is found for both regional and national banks. However, a steady increase 
in both the interest margin and its standard deviation in the last two years may 
suggest that the effect of increased market power through M&As and consolidation 
on the interest spread might have begun to be realized as some have expressed their 
concerns over increased market power.  
To further examine the effect of increased market concentration on the average 
net interest margin, we estimate the following regression equation.  
 
Mit = α + βk Σ Xk,it + γk Σ Yk, it + δk Σ Zk,t + ε it                         (B3)  
 
where Mit = the average net interest margin of bank i at time t, Xk,it = bank specific 
variables of bank i at time t, such as BIS equity ratio, NPL(non performing loans) 
SHARE, BRANCH, and a dummy variable for regional banks, Yk, it = market power 
variables of bank i at time t, such as the market share and HHI. Zk,t = macroeconomic  
% S.D. 
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<Table 6> Panel Regression Results of Equation (B3)  
Dependent Variable: Interest Margin, n = 285 
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Bank Specific 
Variables  
BIS 0.064** 
(8.880) 
0.062** 
(8.420) 
0.064** 
(9.001) 
NPL SHARE -0.024** 
(-3.270) 
-0.023** 
(-2.973) 
-0.025** 
(-3.302) 
BRANCH 0.001** 
(4.788) 
0.001** 
(4.427) 
0.001** 
(4.478) 
Regional Bank Dummy 1.151** 
(15.343) 
1.141** 
(15.267) 
1.148** 
(15.512) 
Market Power  
Variables  
Assets Share  0.052** 
(7.211) 
  
HHI (assets) 3.104** 
(3.7772) 
  
Loans Share  0.045** 
(6.770) 
 
HHI (loans)  3.191** 
(4.354) 
 
Deposits Share   0.053** 
(7.354) 
HHI (deposits)   3.064** 
(3.765) 
Macroeconomic  
Variables  
GDP Growth Rate  0.002 
(0.238) 
-0.003 
(-0.241) 
0.001 
(0.183) 
Inflation Rate 0.009 
(0.661) 
0.022 
(1.175) 
0.010 
(0.726) 
CRISIS -0.087 
(-0.912) 
-0.189 
(-0.928) 
-0.091 
(-0.953) 
Adj. R2  0.947 0.947 0.947 
F  531.39 505.33 537.87  
Note: 1) Estimation results of fixed effects model. The coefficients of the constant under the fixed effects 
model are not reported here 
2) t values are shown in parentheses. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
variables such as economic growth rate, inflation rate and a dummy variable for the 
crisis period. 
Table 6 shows the estimation results of equation (B3). As explained earlier, we 
report the fixed effects model only because the fixed effects model is usually 
regarded as more appropriate than random effects model when population data 
instead of sample data are used as in our study. Market share or market 
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concentration is measured for three different types of assets or liabilities: total assets, 
total loans, and total deposits. Their estimation results are presented in Models 1-3. 
Two market power variables are used: market share of each bank and HHI 
indicating the overall degree of market concentration. The market share, whether it is 
measured in total assets, total loans or total deposits, has a positive and significant 
effect, and so does HHI. 
All bank specific variables have significant effects on the average interest margin 
in all three models. BIS has a significant positive effect and is consistent with the 
signaling theory, which suggests that a higher equity ratio increases confidence 
among bank customers, leading to higher interest spread. NPL SHARE has a 
significant negative effect as expected. Loans are the major income-earning asset of 
banks and higher percentage of non-performing loans negatively affect the interest 
spread. BRANCH shows a positive and significant influence on interest spread 
through bank network effect. 
A dummy variable differentiating regional banks (Regional banks =1) from 
national banks is positive and significant. The average interest margin for regional 
banks is usually higher than that for national banks because interest rates for SMEs 
typically serviced by regional banks include larger costs and risk premiums than 
interest rates for corporate loans typically serviced by national banks. This is evident 
in Figure 1. On the other hand, all macroeconomic variables have no significant 
effects on the average interest margin. CRISIS that has a significant effect on bank 
inefficiency is not significant in explaining the interest spread. The explanatory 
power of Models 1-3 (Adjusted R2) is very high. It can be inferred from the empirical 
results that the bank mergers that have taken place so far have increased market 
concentration and that the increase in individual bank’s market share and overall 
increase in market concentration is positively correlated with increased average 
interest margin.  
 
 
Ⅴ. Conclusions 
 
 
While market concentration in the Korean banking industry decreased during the 
pre-crisis period due to financial deregulation, it has markedly increased since the 
crisis of 1997-1998 because of M&As, P&As of banks and consolidation of banks 
under financial holding company system. With this change, there has been a 
growing concern over market power in the Korean banking industry. In this study 
we examined the effects of the increase in market concentration on bank efficiency 
and competition. 
The collusion theory suggests that mergers and consolidation might be initiated 
by banks in order to extract consumer surplus, and the result would be higher prices 
to consumers and socially inefficient allocation of resources. Empirical results 
indicate that market concentration has not improved bank efficiency through scale 
economies or scope economies. Instead, recent mergers and consolidation of banks 
resulted in an increase in inefficiency regardless of different indicators of inefficiency 
used: X-inefficiency, labor inefficiency or asset inefficiency. While an increase in 
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market share of individual banks improved bank efficiency, the overall market 
concentration ratio measured by HHI resulted in lower efficiency. These findings 
come with comforting news that the relationship between market concentration and 
inefficiency is not completely linear, but of an inverse U-shaped curve. 
The bank mergers and consolidation that have taken place so far have not 
realized scale economies by rationalizing their operations or scope economies by 
rationalizing their business activities. Market concentration has not contributed to 
efficiency through these scale and scope effects. Instead it has resulted in rent 
extraction by oligopolistic banks. Our study also finds that the Korean banking 
industry has been monopolistically competitive except for the crisis period. 
Although an increase in market concentration has not changed the overall level of 
competition measured by the H-statistic, market concentration has raised the 
average interest margin. Therefore, a growing concern over market power in the 
Korean banking industry is worth to note.  
The findings in this study are tenuous, given the following constraints. First, the 
Korean banking industry experienced a sudden change from a non-concentrated 
market to a moderately concentrated market in a very short time period and it is still 
in a transitory period. Second, most mergers and consolidation, especially the big 
ones, occurred towards the end of the sample period, and we may need data of a few 
more additional years to analyze the full effects of these mergers and consolidation 
on efficiency and competition.  
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Appendix 1: Directional Technology Distance Function  
 
 
To measure inefficiency we use the directional technology distance function 
proposed by Fare and Grosskopf (2004) which is based on Chambers, Chung, and 
Färe (1996), a generalization of the Luenberger (1992) benefit function. We assume 
that there are k = 1, …, K banks which employ xk vector of inputs to produce yk vector 
of outputs. The technology for each bank is written as {Tk = { (xk, yk) : inputs can 
produce outputs }. The piecewise linear DEA technology is written as:  
 
 T = { (x,y) : Σ zk xkn ≤ xn , n = 1, …, N, Σ zk ykm ≥ ym , m = 1, …, M,  
 
    Σ zk = 1, k = 1, …, K and zk ≥ 0, k = 1,…, K}                         (C1)  
 
The intensity variables, zk, k = 1, …, K, serve to form linear combinations of all 
observed banks’ inputs and outputs. The N+M inequality constraints restrict the 
technology in that for a particular bank no more output can be produced using no 
less input than a linear combination of all observed inputs and outputs. Requiring 
the intensity variables to sum to one allows variable returns to scale. We assume that 
the first N-1 inputs such as labor, capital, and deposits are variable inputs (xv) and 
can be used in greater or lesser amounts at the bank manager’s discretion, but that 
the Nth input, equity capital (e), is fixed exogenously by bank regulators and owners. 
Therefore, we partition bank k’s input vector as xk = (xvk ; ek).  
Define the directional technology distance function for each bank as  
 
⃗(xvk, ek, yk, gx, ge, gy) = max{:(xk − gx, ek − ge, yk + gy) ∈ T }       (C2)  
 
where variable inputs are contracted in the direction gx, equity capital is contracted 
in the direction ge, and outputs are expanded in the direction of gy . For (xk, ek, yk) ∈T. 
a value of ⃗(xvk, ek, yk, gx, ge, gy)=0 indicates that the bank operates on the frontier of 
T and is efficient for the direction (gx, ge, gy). A value of ⃗(xvk, ek, yk, gx, ge, gy) > 
0indicates inefficiency. We assume that equity capital (e) is fixed exogenously by 
bank regulators and owners, and therefore we choose ge = 0 so that equity capital is 
not scaled upon. For the DEA technology, the directional technology distance 
function for bank k' is estimated as  
 
⃗(xvk', ek', yk', gx, ge, gy) = max     subject to 
  
 Σ zk xvkn ≤ xvk'n - βgx,   n = 1, …, N-1 
 
 Σ zk ek≤ek',  
 
 Σ zk ykm ≥ yk'm + βgy   m = 1, …, M 
 
 Σ zk = 1, k = 1, …, K and zk ≥ 0, k = 1,…, K                                (C3)  
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Figure A shows how the production technology and inefficiency are estimated 
from the observed input and output with an example of four banks: A, B, C, and D. 
The piecewise linear technology, T, is bounded by the lines HB, BD, DA, and the 
horizontal extension from A. Given a direction vector (gx, ge, gy) where ge. is assumed 
to be zero, the directional distance function is defined as (C2) and estimated via (C3). 
This function expands output in the direction gy, contracts inputs in direction gx, and 
is a measure of technical inefficiency (X-inefficiency). Banks A, B, and D produce on 
the frontier of T are technically efficient. Bank C operates inside the frontier and is 
technically inefficient.  
In this study, we measure X-inefficiency by the directional distance between F 
and C in Figure A. For estimation, we use three inputs, which are labor, capital, and 
deposits, and three outputs, which are commercial loans, consumer loans, and 
securities. We choose gy = (1,1,1) and gx = (1,1,1) so that the estimate of inefficiency 
from equation (C3) is the simultaneous unit expansion in the three outputs and unit 
contraction in the three inputs that is feasible, given the best-practice combinations of 
outputs and inputs of the banks in our sample. An inefficient bank earns less 
revenue and incurs higher costs than it would if it operated on the frontier. We sum 
inefficiency over the outputs and inputs and divide by total assets.  
 
X-INEFF = β (Σ gym+ Σ gxn) / Assets = β (1+1+1+1+1+1) / Assets.       (C4) 
m         n 
 
 
[Figure A] The Bank Production Technology (T) and the Directional Distance 
Function assuming gx= -1 and gy= 1. 
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Appendix 2. Panel Regression Results of Equation (A3) with  
inclusion of HHI2 as an Additional Independent 
Variable, n=285 
 
 
Category  Variable  Labor Efficiency Asset Inefficiency X-inefficiency 
Bank Specific 
Variables  
BIS  -0.080 
(-1.543)  
-0.001 
(-1.809) 
0.002 
(1.326) 
NPL SHARE 0.057* 
(2.477) 
0.004** 
(10.892) 
0.003 
(1.793) 
BRANCH 0.001 
(0.924) 
0.001 
(1.913) 
0.001** 
(4.107) 
Regional Bank 
Dummy 
-1.608** 
(-4.803) 
0.007* 
(2.029) 
0.012 
(1.647) 
Market Power  
Variables  
Assets Share -0.021 * 
(-2.149) 
-0.183** 
(-2.959) 
-0.001* 
(1.984) 
HHI (assets) 201.307** 
(8.796) 
2.231** 
(8.660) 
1.728** 
(3.812) 
HHI2 (assets) -757.229** 
(-5.906) 
-10.153** 
(-7.034) 
-8.432** 
(-4.655) 
Macroeconomic  
Variables  
GDP Growth Rate -0.361** 
(-7.042) 
-0.004** 
(-6.703) 
-0.004  
(-1.863) 
 Inflation Rate 0.108** 
(4.011) 
0.006* 
(2.429) 
0.008 
(1.515) 
CRISIS 1.007*  
(2.358) 
0.001* 
(2.012) 
0.044* 
(2.368) 
Adj. R2 0.888 0.941 0.701 
F 194.11 389.66 63.29  
Note: 1) Estimation results of fixed effects model. The coefficients of the constant under the fixed effects 
model are not reported here. 
2) t values are shown in parentheses. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
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Appendix 3. Estimation Results of Equation (B2) with  
exclusion of LnASST Dependent variables:  
lnIR and lnTR, n=285  
 
 
 Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model  
lnIR lnTR  lnIR  lnTR  
Constant    3.518***  
(6.251) 
2.838***  
(4.697)  
lnW1  0.101***  
(3.746)  
0.115***  
(3.102)  
0.092***  
(3.136)  
0.089***  
(3.289)  
lnW2  0.243***  
(6.339)  
0.294***  
(6.184)  
0.251***  
(7.942)  
0.253***  
(8.793)  
lnW3  0.415***  
(3.064)  
0.389***  
(3.215)  
0.484***  
(3.337)  
0.493***  
(3.489)  
NINT  -0.924***  
(-3.271)  
1.478***  
(6.769)  
-0.702***  
(-3.104)  
1.604***  
(7.775)  
NPL SHARE  -0.008  
(-0.750)  
-0.011  
(-1.039)  
-0.003  
(-0.329)  
-0.008  
(-1.235)  
BIS  0.038**  
(2.245)  
0.042**  
(2.359)  
0.011*  
(1.777)  
0.025**  
(2.069)  
ADJ. R2  0.987  0. 989  0.979  0.984  
H statistic  0.759***  
(6.783)  
0.798***  
(6.964)  
0.827***  
(8.138)  
0.835***  
(8.651)  
Wald test: H=0  
(ρ-value)  
557.38***  
(0.000)  
609.42***  
(0.000)  
673.22***  
(0.000)  
654.55***  
(0.000)  
Wald test: H=1  
(ρ-value)  
58.36***  
(0.000)  
49.21*** 
(0.000)  
30.25***  
(0.000)  
34.75***  
(0.000)   
Note: 1) The coefficients of the constant under the fixed effects model are not reported here.  
2) t values are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
